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IN rfHE SUPREME COURT
()F 1'HE STATE OF UTAH
,\lEL \' lN M. MILLER, dba S & E
DISTIUBUTING COl\IPANY, and
LIXDSEY YV AREHOUSE COMP AXY, INC,
Plaintiffs,
YS.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMl\IISSJON OF UTAH, DARLENE F.
ASAY, widow of LeRoy M. Asay, deceased, FRANK E. MARTENS, and
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Case No.
11873

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Review
pursuant to Section 35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, from an Award of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.
1

DISPOSITION HY THE
INDUSTRIAL
On
:W, 1969, the Industrial Commission ?11tered its .Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Award against .Melvin .M. Miller (hereinafter called
either "Miller" or "Plaintiff"), an individual doing
business as S & E Distributing Company, an individual
proprietorship (hereinafter called "S & E"), for
allegedly failing to provide 'V orkmen's Compensatiou
Insurance for the employees of said Company as required by State law. The Commission, at the same
time, dismissed the claims against Lindsey 'Varehouse
Company, Inc. (hereinafter called "Lindsey 'Varehouse"), Frank E ..Martens, and The State Insurance
Fund (hereinafter called "The Fund"), all parties to
the action. The Award was entered against
individually and awarded compensation to the claimant
for a total of $14,227.20.
Subsequently on July 23, 1969, Miller filed with
the Industrial Commission of Utah a Motion for a 'Vrit
of Review on behalf of himself and Lindsey \V arehouse,
asking that the award be amended to provide compensation to the claimant under the provisions of the insur·
ance policy held by Miller as an individual doing busi·
ness as Lindsey V\T arehouse, or in the alternative, that
the hearing examiner enter an order allowing the re·
opening of the record to allow introduction of additional, material evidence then available and which was
not available at the time of the initial hearing. Such
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Motion for a 'V rit of Review was denied by the In<luslnal Commission on September 12, 1969. This
a1)peal nhtes to both the initial award and the denial
of lhe Motio11 for a 'Vrit of Review.
HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to set aside the order of the Industrial Commission as it relates to Miller's indiYidual
liability for payment of his claim, for the reason that
the Commission's decision was contrary to the intent
and purpose of the YV orkmen' s Compensation Laws,
>vas arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to the established facts. Plaintiff argues that The Fund is the
responsible for the payment of this claim and
petitions this Court to direct the Commission to order
The Fund to compensate claimant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime prior to June 13, 1966, Miller, who
owned and operated Lindsey 'Varehouse, entered into
negotiations with defendant Frank E. Martens for the
purchase of a business owned by Martens, S & E Distributing Company. The S & E operation was basically
a wholesale or jobber of pre-packaged candy, nuts, and
popeorn ( R. 403) . A small part of the business consisted of roasting and popping popcorn and packaging
these items. Other than these small manufacturing
processes, the business consisted of rebagging or disJ

tributing from the S & E warehouse ( R. 343) . Lindsey Warehouse and S & E were located immediately
adjacent to one another at 353 West Second South
and 357 'Vest Second South respectively. A preliminary agreement was signed on the 13th day of June,
1966, relating to the purchase of the business by l\Iiller
(R. 242 and 454). At that time, Martens cancelled his
'V orkmen' s Compensation Insurance covering the employees of S & E (R. 514).
On July 1(), 1966, .Miller filed his quarterly tax
reports (due July 31, 1966) to the State and the
Federal government based upon wages paid to employees. At the same time he filed his semi-annual
report to The Fund which covered the employees of
Lindsey Warehouse. The new employees so acquired
of S & E were not included on either report ( R. 376).
Both Miller and his Certified Public Accountant testified as to the reasons for the exclusion of the S & E
employees on these reports ( R. 17 4-176) . The employees of S & E were, however, included on both
reports in the next reporting period ending December
31, 1966 (R. 377 and 453).
On August 5, 1966, claimant's husband was killed
in the course of and within the scope of his employment
as a truck driver for S & E (R. 163). The sole ques·
tion in this litigation is whether .Miller's policy with
The Fund covers the claimant who is entitled to compensation under the 'Vorkmen' s Compensation Laws
of Utah.
4

The record indicates that there was a policy of
in.,m:rnct· wtil-. The Fund in existence at the time of
ihc acci<leut, and in the name of Miller, an individual
doing business as Lindsey 'Varehouse ( R. 445-450).
The employer's payroll and premium report of December 31, 1965, designated the present status of tl!_e
insured as a "corporation" (R. 142) but the policy remained in the name of Melvin M. Miller, an individual,
until September 13, 19uu, one month after the accident
(R. 450).

1n due course, the claimant filed a claim with the
Industrial Commission for compensation ( R. 3-6) .
Consequently, a dispute arose as to who was liable for
payment of the claim as between Miller, dba S & E
Distributing Company, Lindsey 'Varehouse, Frank E.
l\lartens, or The Fund. A hearing on this matter was
held before the Industrial Commission on June 28 and
:W, l!.)()7. The Industrial Commission, in its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law ( R. 513-515) dismissed the action as to the defendants Lindsey 'Varehouse Company, Inc., Frank E. :Martens, and the State
Insurance Fund, and assessed individual liability
against :Miller for payment of claimant's claim.
The Examiner found that Miller, acting as an individual, was the actual employer of the S & E employees, and that no relationship extended to Lindsey
\V arehouse ( R. 514).
The Examiner also found that insurance coverage
existed for Lindsey 'Varehouse, but that neither Miller
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nor S & E were covered ( R. 514) . The Commissiou
therefore concluded that inasmuch as the employees of
S & E were those of Miller rather than of Lindsey
YVarehouse, and because the insurance policy coYered
only Lindsey 'Varehouse, that :Miller, as an individual,
was liable for the claim. An award was consequently
entered against Miller individually for !\iH,227.20 including statutory funeral expenses of $525.00, and
$1,400.00 attorney's fees to be deducted from the accrued compensation (R. 515).
On July 23, 1969, Miller filed a .Motion for a 'Vrit
of Review with the Industrial Commission alleging
(R. 521):
1. That The Fund was liable for the claim because

its policy covered not only Lindsey \V arehouse, the
corporation, but also .Miller, as the proprietor, on the
date of the accident (R. 521).
2. That Lindsey 'Varehouse, the corporation, \vas
the actual purchaser of S & E, and that coverage existed

for the claimant under the corporation's policy with
The Fund ( R. 524) .
3. That if the errors in the award did not require

modification of the award, that the records should be
reopened so as to admit the newly discovered evidence
(R. 527).
On September 12, 1969, the Commission entered
its decision on the .Motion for the 'V rit of Review in
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which it <leniet 1 said Motion for the following reasons
(R. 561):

That even if the S & E operation had in fal'.t
been purchased by Lindsey Warehouse Company,
rnverage of S & E employees was not applied for nor
extended to said employees.
1.

That the report filed by Lindsey 'V arehouse
on July 16, 1966, did not include the additional payroll
of S & E nor did it include the additional job classific:1tions of these employees.
It therefore concluded that the evidence contained
in file in the initial award was sufficient to sustain the
hearing examiner's decision in that case. It ordered
that the .Motion for Review filed by Miller should be
denied and thereby in so doing, refused to reopen the
case for additional consideration (R. 561).
HaYing exhausted all administrative remedies, the
plaintiff now appeals from the decisions of the Industrial Commission.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM AGAINST
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND 'VAS CONTRAHY TO THE 'VORKMEN'S COMPEXSATION STATUTES OF UTAH, CONTRARY
TO ESTABLISHED AUTHORITY, AND
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
7

The hearing examiner in the award found that the
issues before the Commission were limited to (a) who
was, in fact, the employer of the deceased at the time
of the accident, and ( b) who was responsible for the
payment of the benefits to the applicant.
Point I will attempt to show that The Fund was
indeed the party responsible for payment of compensation to the applicant, and that it was an error of law
for the Commission to not so hold. In so doing it will
be demonstrated that: (a) the scope and purpose of
The Fund indicates that this employee (LeRoy Asay)
should have been covered by The Fund's policy; (b)
the Utah statutes intend that insurance coverage be
of a "full coverage" type, thereby extending coverage
to all employees under the 'Vorkmen's Compensatiou
Act, and covering the entire liability of an employer
who is insured, and; ( c) the Industrial Commissiou
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in failing
to follow its established statutory procedures, and that
The Fund was derelict in its duties of investigation
and audit of Miller and Lindsey 'Varehouse in the
acquisition of S & E.

A. The purpose and scope of the State Insurancr
Fund.
The purpose of the State Insurance Fund is
set forth in 35-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
reads in part as follows:
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"35-3- 1. State Insurance Fund - Purpose.
There shall be maintained a fund, to be known
as the State Insurance Fund, for the purpose of
insuriny employers against liability for compensation based upon compensable accidental injuries
and against liability for compensation on the
account of occupational disease, and of assuring
to the persons entitled thereto, the cornpensation
provided by law . . ." (emphasis added)

l t is clearly stated that the purpose of the State
Insurance .Fund is to protect the employer who insures
with this .Fund. Of course, not only is the employer
protected, but also the employee is assured that he will
be compensated for injuries sustained while on the job
(simple, adequate, and speedy compensation), and t'o
protect him from an otherwise judgment - proof
employer.

\ Vorkmen' s Compensation Insurance, therefore, is
much more than a mere ordinary insurance policy in
that it creates a vested right in the employee to compensation, irrespective of the actions of either the insurance carrier or the employer. Arthur Larsen, in his
treatise on 'Vorkmen's Compensation entitled Workrnan's Cornpensation Law, Section 92.00, makes the
following comment:
"Compensation insurance creates a sort of insured status in the employee. If it did no more
than protect the employer from any liability incurred bv him under compensation law, there
would
no occasion for discussion of such insurance in connection with compensation law at
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all. The employer's rights would be fixed by substantive compensation law, and all questions of
the insurer's relation to the liability would be a
simple application of general insurance law, just
as an automobile liability insurer's position h
worked out by a direct interpretation of the insurance contract. Compensation insurance, however, has come to be an integral part of the compensation system which unlike tort litigation,
which is an adversary contest to right or wrong
between contestants, JF orkmen's Compensation
is a s,1;stern, not a conte.<;t, to supply security to
the injured 'i.1.:orkcr and to distribute the costs tu
the consumer of the product." (emphasis added)

lt is clear, then, that this type of insurance has in mind
the very ultimate of protection to the injured employee.
Simply stated, the purpose of such insurance stands in
two relations: First, to the employer, to protect him
from the burden of compensation liability; and secondly,
and more important, to the employee, to insure that
he gets the benefits called for by statute.
As between the insurance carrier and the employee,
defenses by the carrier based upon the misconduct or
omissions of the employer are of no relevance in determining liability. In Workmen's Compensation Lav.:,
Supra, Section 92.20, pg. 446, Larsen states that this
is a rule of general application and that several states
have incorporated it in their statutes, these states being
Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and 'iVisconsin. The Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that this is the case in Utah. In
Continental Casualty Company vs. Industrial Commis-
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siun of f!tah, 61 Ut. 16, 210 P.127, ( 1922), the Supreme
C•)urt indici,ted that fraudulent statements which in<luced the issuance of an insurance policy are no defrn::.e
against the employee. 'Vhile the actual decision in this
case a1mulled an Industrial Commission award for
compensation, it did hold:

" ... The Industrial Commission was without
authority to determine or hold that his terms
were not in force and binding upon the casualty
company at the time of the accident. If the
policy was obtained by fraud or if a mistake was
made in fixing the date when the same should
become effective, the Industrial Commission is
not the tribunal to grant the plaintiff relief . . .
The Commission has no power to do otherwise
than to enforce and apply his terms as the same
appear in the policy."
In Empey vs. the Industrial Commission of Utah,
Ul Ut. 234<, 63 P.2d 630, (1937), this Court held at
page 636 of 63 P .2d:
"To deny the injured employees compensation
merely because those who drew the policy with
knowledge of the facts misconceived the legal
relations of the parties flowing from such facts
would work a grave injustice to the injured employees without any fault on their part."
lt has also been held that even non-payment of
premiums does not entitled the carrier to deny liability
to the employee. In Home Life and Accident Company
vs. Orchard, 227 S.,V. 705 (Tex. CiY. App. 1921), it
was held that if an employer was protected by the policy
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issued by his employees' workmen's compensation insurer, such protection was not lost because the employer
failed to pay the proper premium to the insurer. If the
employer owed the premium and does not pay
it,
he still owes it, and it is subject to audit and payment.
See also, Traders and General Insurance Co. v. Henderson, 235 Ark. 896, 362 S.,V.2d 671 (1962).
It can be seen then that \Vorkmen's Compensation
Insurance occupies a very different and distinct posture
than does ordinary liability insurance. It is the policy
of 'Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance to have the
rights and interests of the employee foremost in mind.
When a dispute arises between an employer and his
insurance carrier, the policy behind Workmen's Compensation should be the point upon which liability turns.
Mere technicalities and formalities which are points of
dispute between the parties should not deny the em·
ployee his right of speedy compensation when a policy
of insurance exists.

In the case at hand, there is no question that a
policy of insurance with The Fund was in force upon
which liability could turn. It is therefore submitted
that the foregoing clearly illustrates that the policy of
'Vorkmen' s Compensation Insurance requires that the
employee's right to compensation not turn on
insignificant points as compared with the intended purpose of 'Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance and the
rights of the employee.
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B. The Utah statute zs in the nature of a "full
1·ove1aqe" statute.
111 Larsen's W urkmen's Compensation Law, Sectif)l] 93.10, pg. 459, he discusses the various types of
'Vorkme11's Compensation statutes. He classifies these
statutes as follows:
( l) Full coverage statutes.
( 2) Modified coverage statutes.

( 3) Statutes

which

provide

for

no

express

coyer age.

ln discussing these statutes, Mr. Larsen says:
"Under most compensation acts, either by express proYision or by court interpretation, the
la,,. has undertaken to compel a certain minimum
coverage in insurance contracts, regardless of
any narrower agreement between the insurer and
the employer . . . The principal reason is probably the convenience of being able to assume that
so far as the employee is concerned, the liability
of the insured is completely co-extensive with
that of the employer, so that one proceeding can
settle the liability of both."
Larsen describes the full coveraye statute as the
type of statute which states that policies of insurance
must coyer the employer's entire liability. In Section
9:3.:W, Mr. Larsen says:
"The usual language is something like this:
'Every policy of insurance covering the liability
of an employer for compensation shall cover the
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entire liability of the employer to his
under the act.' At first glance, it might seem that
there could be only one interpretation of this
sweeping language - coverage of all the tmployees of the assured in all occ1Lpations and all
businesses. 1'his is, indeed, the meaning accepted
by the majoritv of courts." (emphasis added)

Larsen goes on to state that many courts have been
disturbed with this broad sweeping language and have
attempted to impose certain restrictions and qualifications into such statutes. He concludes:
"This judicial tampering with the unqualified
language of the statute seems unjustified."
It is submitted that the Utah statute relating to
Workmen's Compensation Insurance is indeed a "full
coverage" type statute. Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Section 31-19-15, states in part:
"Every policy of insurance covering t,he liability of an employer for compensation shall
cover the entire liability of the employer to his
employees on account of compensable and accidental injuries and occupational diseases covered
by the policy or contract .... " (emphasis added)

Applying Larsen's analysis and the literal meaning and interpretation of the Utah statute, one can rcal.'h
only a single conclusion: That under the Utah 'Vorkmen's Compensation laws, the insurance is to cover the
entire liability of the employer to all of his employees.
Accordingly, any policy of insurance issued to an employer should cover the entire liability of that employer
to his employees.
14

The Utah courts adhere to the position of the maof ti1e courts which have interpreted full-covera!re
b
and the Utah courts, as well as the courts c;f
the neighboring states, uphold the full-coverage interpretation of the applicable statute. As indicated by the
following cases, Utah courts have ignored payment of
premiums, proper classification of employees, and the
name in which the policy was issued, in determining
whether a given policy provided compensation for an
injured employee.

u

1

•

In Empe,t/ vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,
Supra, the court was called upon to determine whether
certain employees were entitled to the benefits of a
policy of insurance which was issued in the name of the
Escalante Company. In this case, the Escalante Company owned certain property and contracted with the
Arrowhead Company to do certain drilling on it. There
was l'.ommon ownership of stock and common management between the companies. The companies also maintained joint offices, and one set of books was kept n,r
the eompanies in regard to this operation. In this case,
there was much confusion as to the name in which the
policy should be issued. After several changes, the
policy was issued iu the name of the Escalante Company. In the course of the drilling, employees were
injured. The Commission found that the injured perso11s were employees of Arrowhead and disallowed the
claim. The Court reversed the decision of the Commission and, in effect, held that the name of the insured
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in the policy is not controlling. The Court in so doing
stated as follows:
" ... the evidence shows without conflict that
the policy here relied upon by plaintiffs was issued as a coverage for the workmen engaged iu
the operations incident to the development of the
Escalante well where the explosion occurred."
The Court further stated as follows:
"To deuy the injured employees compensation
merely because those who drew the policy with
knowledge of the facts misconceived the legal
relations of the parties flowing from such facts.
would work a grave injustice to the injured employees without any fault on their part."
" ... Neither of the defendants can escape liability because the Escalante Company rather
than the Arrowhead Company was named as
the insured in the policy involved in this
controversy."
This case clearly indicates that the Courts will go
to great lengths to find an employee to be covered under
an existing policy of insurance. The case also indicates
that the Utah public policy, as expressed by its Supreme
Court, is in favor of finding coverage to exist. In the
Empey case, the Court used the test of intent in order
to determine whether coverage should be extended to
the employees in question. The Court looked to the
intent of the employer in taking out the policy to determine whether the injured employee should be able to
claim benefits from the insurer.
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From consideration of the above holding of the
t_'tah Supreme Court, it is clear that the exte11sion of
cm'<:rage should not turn upon the name of the insured
and the party actually shown as the owner of the policy.
The Empe,lj case indicates that a decision to the effect
that the name of the insured and the party shown to
be the owner of the policy were the controlling factors
in finding no coverage existed, would be contrary to
public policy and to the purpose of the lVorkmen's
Compensation Acts, and also contrary to the announced
intention and policy of the courts which have held that
the statutes and insurance contracts will be liberally
construed to cover the employees engaged in an operation or activity which could reasonably be construed to
he intended to be covered by a policy of insurance which
has been issued.
The Utah courts have followed the almost universal rule of extending coverage in cases similar to the
one now before this Court. This was done as early as
in the Utah case of Anderson vs. Last Chance
Ranch Company, et al., 63 Ut. 551, 228 P. 184 ( 1924).
lu this case, the Last Chance Ranch Company, a Utah
corporation, was engaged in the general business of
agriculture. It hired from three to fifteen men. It <lecided to construct a house upon its ranch properties to
be occupied by its general manager, and to accomplish
this it engaged two carpenters and a carpenter's helper,
.Anderson, to work with its regular farm hands to constrnct the house. During the course of the construction
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of the house, Anderson was instructed by someone in
authority to assist in unloading and storing grocen
provisions to be consumed by the farm hands in tlie
basement of the house. In so doing, he was injured and
out of this injury a claim was asserted against the corporation under the workmen's compensation statutes.
The defense of the corporation was that Anderson
engaged in a farming activity which was excluded under
the compensation statutes. The claimant contended that
the corporation, as far as his employment was concerned,
was engaged in the construction business and, therefore,
he had a right to make a claim against the corporation
under the workmen's compensation statutes.
The Court refused to decide the case on a narrm1
finding that even though Anderson was hired as a carpenter's helper to work on the construction of the house
he was, in fact, during the time of the temporary diversion, engaged in an agricultural pursuit in that he was
handling provisions for the agricultural business. Rnther, the Court found that the construction of the house
in question was merely incidental to the corporation's
farming business and so much so as to be rightly considered a part of it. The Court stated that
was "regularly employed in the same business, or i11
and about the same establishment" as a part of the agricultural business of the corporation. In so doing, the
Court construed what is meant by the Utah statutory
language concerning "regularly employed in the same
business" and in doing so stated:
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"l t means all employments in the usual courst
oi tile trade, business, profession or occupation
uf ae employer."
The Utah Court concluded its opm10n criticizing
'the narrow ledge upon which some of the decisions
stand" in making a determination that a particular
activity is not within the scope of the regular business
of an employer. It is true that in this Utah case the
finding that Anderson was regularly employed in the
agricultural business of the corporation resulted in excluding him from the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act.
HoweYer, in doing so the Court made a determination
that the construction of the house on the ranch property
by the corporation was a part of and incident to the
agricultural business of the corporation. It is evident
that at this early date the Utah Court recognized that
an employer could engage in various types of activities
which would complement and be considered a reasonable
extension of the general business of the employer.
The holding in Harding vs. Industrial Commission
uf Utah, et al., 83 Ut. 326, 28 P.2d 182 ( 1934) is similar.
In the Harding case, Harding was regularly engaged in loading and unloading the brick kilns. However, at the time of his injury, he was temporarily working in hauling hay off the fields owned by his employer.
This hay was used to feed the horses owned an<l used
hy the brick company for dray age purposes.
The Fund policy contained no classification for
employees engaged in agricultural activities. The Fund,
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in defense, contended that under the contract of insurance, it undertook the coverage only of employee.., of
the company engaged in work specified in the contrad.
The Fund further contended that it could not be held
liable merely because Harding was generally engaged
in work covered by the policy.
The Court in finding that the Fund policy should
be held to extend coverage to Harding stated that:
"An employee injured while performing an
act which is fairly incident to the prosecution
of the business, trade or occupation of the employer and appropriate in carrying it forward
and providing for its needs is not to be barred
from the benefits of compensation because the
act i!' not wholly embraced in the precise and
characterization process or operation made the
basis of the group in which employment is
claimed."
Decisions from other states have interpreted statutes
similar to the Utah full coverage statutes. In frf aryland
Casualty Compan.IJ vs. Marion J. Sullivan, et, al., 160
Tex. 515, 334 S."\V.2d 783 ( 1960), the court stated:
"'Vhere an employer procures coverage fo,r
part of his employees under the 'V orkmen s
Compensation Act, this coverage will extend to
all other of his employees who work in the same
general class of business."
In this case, insurance coverage covered a corporation
in the business of selling fertilizers and chemicals. The
owner of this company also was the major stockholder
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c1Jtd ui rnager of a crop dusting company. The pilot
f' u ihe / ."<•p dusting company was killed in an airplane
;u-cidcnt awl the court held that he was covered b._·
the \Vorkmen's Compensation policy that had been
issue<l to the fertilizer awl chemical company, although
it eontained no designation or classification for an airplane pilot and no premium had been paid for such a
dassitiication.
Iii a reel'ut Idaho Supreme Court decision, Clawson
c:s. General Insurance Company of Arnerica, 90 Ida .
.J.24, 412 P .id 597 ( 19u()), the court held that the name
in which a compensation policy is issued is not controlling, but that it will cousider the operation intended
to be covered in determining whether the issued policy
should cover the employees involved. In this case, two
separate building contractors had entered into a joint
yeuture for the construction of a school. For a time,
the joint ,·enture obtained and kept in force a compensation policy for the joint venture. The policy was
cancelled prior to the accident which gaYe rise to the
compeu.satio11 claim. The individual venturers conLiuued to maintain separate policies on their own indi,·i<lua l contracting businesses. The court held that the
policies issued to the indiYidual joint venturers should
be extended to coyer the claim arising out of the joint
venture operation. The Idaho Supreme Court quoted
jfr Larsen and his treatise on 'Vorkmen' s Compensa t irn1 in stating:
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"The omission by an employer to list or pay
a premium upon an employee does not effect th'f
right of the employee to receive compensation
from the carrier." See 2 Larsen, Workmen's
Compensation, 92.20. Clawson vs. General [ 11 •
surance Company of America, Supra, at 602.
Again, as in the Empey case, supra, the court is
looking to the employer's intent when providing compensation insurance to determine whether the particular employee injured, was covered by the employer's
compensation insurance. It is submitted by the plaintiff that on the date that LeRoy M. Asay, husband of
the applicant, was killed, he was an employee within
the meaning of the statute of Lindsey ,;v arehouse and
Melvin M. Miller.
The Utah statute in defining when an employer
shall be considered subject to the W or kmen's Compensation Act does not necessarily limit the consideration to a certain type of business activity in determining whether an employer is an employer subject to the
Act. Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as fallows:
"The following shall constitute employers
subject to the provisions of this title:

* * *

(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility, having in
service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same business, or in or
about t.he same establishment, under any contract
of hire, ...
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'"i'he term 'regularly' as herein used shall i11all employments in the usual course of the
trade, business, profession or occupation of the
employer, whether continuous throughout the
year or for only a portion of the year."
The above language indicates that a person is
regularly employed by an employer if he is engaged
in an employment which is in the usual course of the
trade or business of the employer.
The Utah Supreme Court extended this statutory
coverage by its decision in the Empey case, supra. In
that case the Court decided that an injured employee
was entitled to the benefits of a workmen's compensation
policy where the workman was employed by a company not covered by insurance, but was injured while
performing work incident to the expansion and development of the business of another employer, who was
covered by compensation insurance.
As is evident from the undisputed evidence of the
hearing held 011 the 28th and 29th days of July, 1967,
LeRoy Asay was killed while driving a truck in the
course of his employment. There would also seem to be
no dispute that at the time of his death, Mr. Asay was
employed hy a company which was being operatccl by
MelYin l\Iiller, either in his capacity as an individual
or through the Lindsey 'i\T arehouse as a corporation.
(R 163 and 271)
1t therefore follows from the decisions and statutes
preYiously cited herein, that any claim which Asay
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would have against his employer would be covered bv
the existing policy of workmen's compensation insm:_
ance regardless of the name in which the policv \1 :·.
issued, the employee classifications shown on the polil'\,
or the payment or lack of payment of insurance
miums with respect to LeRoy Asay.
It is this plaintiff's contention that the decedent
at the time of his death was engaged in an activity
which was an integral and long-standing type of activity
necessarily incident to the type of warehousing business in which the plaintiff had been engaged for many
years (R. 238-239;
and which had been coYered by the insurance policy in question.

The clear meaning of the language of the State
Insurance Fund policy indicates that a broad coverage
is intended. In this regard, reference is made to the
first paragraph of the State Insurance Fund poliry
which reads as follows:
"(Hereinafter called the 'Fund') does hereby
agree with the Employer named and described
as such in the declarations hereinafter set forth
and hereby made a part hereof, to insure the
Employer against liability for compensation
under the 1Vorkmcn'8 Compensation Act and
the Utah Occupational Di8ease Disabilit.11 Lmc,
as provided in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of Title 35,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and all amendments
thereto, including liability to pay for medical
and other treatment and care of injured employees as required by said Acts;"
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I•'uJ'tlier, the first paragraph under the heading "Emnl(l::ers I ,iability Coverage" in the policy reads in part
;"J inv. s:

"The Fund will indemnif.y this Employer
against loss by reason of the liability imposed
upon him by law for damages on account of personal injuries to such of his employees as arc
ler;ally employed, wherever such injuries may be
sustained within the territorial limits of the
United States of America or the Dominion of
Canada."
This broad coverage language is consistent with the
full-coYerage statute (31-19-15 U.C.A.) referred to
preYiously. It is also evident from this language that
the only condition precedent to payment of a claim is
that the employee be legally employed. It is undisputed that Asay was legally employed by Melvin Miller
or Lindsey \V arehouse ( R. 159) .
It may be that The Fund relies on the following
language contained under the declarations in its policy
as a basis for limiting the coverage of the policy: "No
other operation of any nature will be conducted by the
except as follows: No exceptions." ( R. 449)

In regard to construing policy coverage, the fol·
lowing statement is found in Workmen's Compensation
Law, supra, Section 94.30 page 468:
"Finally, when a question of construing policy
c·oyerage arises exclusively between insurer and
insured, it might be thought that the terms of
their contract should be allowed to control. How-
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ever, if the statute expressly says that an insurer's entire liability must be covered, the unqualified language of the statute is broad enoL•gh
to include issues arising between the insurer and
the insured."
On page 533 of Volume 3 of the same treatise Mr.
Larson states:
"Hmvever, the routine statement of classification on the policy which is relevant to the assigning of rates as between insurer and employer
should not necessarily outweigh the unqualified
language of a full-coverage statute specifically
designed to deal with the problems caused br
incomplete coverage." ( R. 47 4)
·
The record indicates that The Fund went to great
lengths to show that the classifications of S & E employees and those of Lindsey \V arehouse were differ·
ent, ( R. 176-178) and such evidence was apparent!>·
given much credence by the examiner in holding that
the policy did not cover the employees of S & E (R.
561). Mr. Larson is making it clear that where a state
has a full coverage statute the classification numbers
or lack of such numbers on an insurance policy are to
be given very little weight in determining whether the
insurer is liable for the payment of the claim.
The plaintiff strongly urges the Utah Statute is
indeed of 'the "full coverage type" and that it extend,
coverage to the entire liability of the employer to all
of his employees. The foregoing has amply demonstrated
through statutory interpretation and case law that the
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mere tel·hniealities of coverage such as employee dcsignabrn, pa) 'nent of premiums, and even the name of
the unployer so insured are not controlling in estalJlishiug coverage in corresponding liability of the insurance carrier or the employer.
The Hearing Examiner chose to disregard all of
the foregoing argument as set forth by learned counsel during the initial hearing. Plaintiff concedes that
it is the function of the commission to weigh the evidence, and it may at times even refuse to follow uncontradicted evidence in the record, but when it does
so, we submit, that its reasons for rejecting shonltl
appear inasmuch as the Hearing Examiner gives us
no indication as to why this argument was not taken
into consideration. Plaintiff argues that this Court should
find that such action was arbitrary, and capricious, that
it was au error at law for the Commission to disregard
the clear purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compensation Statutes, and that public policy demands that
administrative judicial bodies carry out the legislatiYe
intent of these statutes. The award should be set aside
on these grounds.
C. 'l'hc Industrial Commission acted in an arbi-

trary and capricious manner in failing to follow
its established statutory procedures, and The
Fund ww1 derelict in its duties of investigMion
and audit of ft'Iiller and Lind.Yey Warehouse.
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The Plaintiff, in the preceding argument, has attempted to show that such technicalities as the name
in which the policy was issued, the employee's
fication shown on the policy, or the payment or lack
of payment of insurance premiums, are not in themselves enough to defeat the liability of the authorized
insurance carrier.
Although this Plaintiff feels that the prior arguments negate the necessity of proceeding along the
following line of reasoning, he will attempt to sh0\1
that The Fund should be estopped from denying lia·
bility, and that the Commissions' Award be set aside.
The basis for such an argument is the Plaintiff's contention that the Commission failed to follow its statutorily imposed procedures, and that the Plaintiff was
denied certain rights of notice as a result of the arbitrary actions of both The Fund and the Industrial
Commission.
Section 35-1-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
makes it the duty of every employer to file with the
Commission a notice of his insurance.
The employer shall forthwith file with the
commission in a form prescribed by it a notice
of his insurance, together with a copy of the
contract or policy of insurance.
It is undisputed that both Lindsey \Varehouse
and S & E were at some time covered by insurance.
and presumably each policy was filed with the Commission prior to the acquisition of S & E by :Miller.
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;\larteus, rloing business as S & E, testified that he was
cu.
by a policy of insurance which coverage extended up through June 30, 1966 (R. 416).
The record indicates that S & E had been covered
by a policy of insurance with the State Insurance Fund
when it was under the proprietorship of one Carl Burdett, though Burdett had cancelled his policy when
:Martens acquired the business in 1965 (R. 175-176).
testimony would seem to indicate then that
his insurance was with a private carrier, and pursuaut
to la"· a copy of the poJicy should have been filed with
the 111dustrial Commission. If Martens insurance
expired as of June 30, 1966, or if indeed, he had no
insurance, the Commission is chargeable with notice
that uo insurance was in effect for the employees of
S & E from June 30, 1966 to the time of the accident.
These facts establish quite conclusively that the Commission did indeed have notice, or was chargeable with
such uotice, that no insurance was in existence for these
employees, and pursuant to statute, the Commission
should have brought action to compel coverage of the
employees of S & E.
The Statutes make it clear that it is the Commission's responsibility to make sure all employers have
insurance. In Section 35-1-46 this responsibility and
is affirmatively set forth,
"If the Commission has reason to believe that
an employer of one or more employees is conducting a business without securing the payment
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of compensation in one of the three ways nro·
vided in this
the C_ommission may
such
five days wntte.n notice by regi,
tered mail of such noucomplrnnce, and if the
employer within said period does not reme<ly
such default, the Commission may file suit
in the section above provided and the Court is
empowered, ex parte, to issue without bond a
temporary injunction restraining the further
operation of the employer's business."

gin

There is no evidence that the Commission ever gm
either .Martins or Miller any notice regarding the noncoverage of the employees of S & E Distributing
Company.
In his treatise, 1Vorkmen's Compensation Lau:,
supra, .Mr. Larsen states, in Section 93.4:2 on pg. 46j:
"It may be observed in passing that little
weight is given in any of these to the question
of whether premiums were in fact paid on thf
employee in question. The company's payrolb
are open to the insurer's inspection, and it is up
to the insurer that if there is any controversy
about coverage, to bring an action for any pre·
miums the employer refuses to pay."

In this excerpt, .Mr. Larsen makes it clear that
the burden is on the insurer to collect any additional
premiums due by virtue of a company's acquiring new
employees, and the fact that a premium has not beeu
paid on the particular employee in question does not
absolve the insurance fund from liability arising b1
virtue of a compensable injury to an employee. The
Utah courts have also made it clear that it is the duh'
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of au

earner to make inquiries and inYesticoverage or noncoverage of ern]Jl::_i "C'>
111 the previously cited case Empey vs. the
Jw/uslriol Commission of Utah, Supra, the Court
,tatecl:
l'•

"If the management of the fund desire to be
more fully a<hisecl as to the nature of such interests, a request should have been made thereof.
:Xotice of the fact that the Arrowhead Company
was interested in the drilling of the Escalante
well was notice to all that would have been discovered upon further inquiry.

II l re the Court estopped the State Insurance Fund
from denying liability 011 the grounds of failure to make
proper inYestigations as to the nature of the entities
involved. The Court went on to say
'·Neither of the defendants can escape liability
because the Escalante Company rather than the
Arrowhead Company was named as the insurer
in the policy involved in this controversy."
The language of the policy with the State Insurarn:c Fund itself is interesting:
"Any increase of such estimated payroll, or
the actual payroll, based upon later informatiou
furni:;hed by the insured employer or b.'f audit
hu the Jund. The insured employer shall permit
such audit and gfre such information when requested by the fund."
l t is significant there is an affirmative duty or
burden put upon The Fund to "investigate" and
''audit" in order to insure that there is an adjustment
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of premiums pai<l commensurate with the type of risl
and the amount of payroll involved.
It would seem that The Fund has been dereJie:
in its obligations and responsibilities to audit and iu.
vestigate existing policies of insurance. There is 111 ,
question that a policy of insurance with The Fund wa.1
outstanding, and The Fund has the policy-given riglii
of continual i1westigation and au<lit in order to adjust
the coverage of premiums. If Miller is to be penalizerl
for failure to file a report, should not The Fund lit
estopped from denying liability for this claim for failurt
to follow its established procedures?

Likewise, the Commission has been guilty of some
looseness in its procedures, and arbitrary in its action
toward this plaintiff. There is no question but that the
rights as provided by the 'V orkmen' s Compensati011
Statutes of Utah regarding notice, have been denied
him. Again, if this plaintiff is to be subjected to such
a harsh penalty for the mere failure to file a report
and include newly acquired employees thereby, it i1
submitted that the Commission cannot point the finger
of guilt toward this plaintiff when it itself was in part
responsible for his failure to file. The foregoing, 11t
believe, amply justifies this Court in setting aside the
award for the reason that the Commission's actions werr·
arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with
law.
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POINT II

TUE

INDUSTRIAL
/l.HCSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
AllBITRAllY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNEH \VHEN IT REFUSED TO REOPEN THE
CASE UPON MOTION FOR REVIEVV, AND
FAILED TO TAKE OFFICIAL NOTICE OF
,\.DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDING.
The Commission in its Fiu<lings of Fact an<l Concl11sio11s of Law and Awar<l, states "There is no proba tin· eYidence to make a finding that
'Varehouse Company, Inc., was the employer" (R. 515).
\Yhik we do not concur with the blanket statemen[ of the commission, we submit that even if such
had heen the case at the time of the initial hearing, it
not so at the date of the petition for a
of
Re\·iew. Evidence was then available in the form of
a proceeding in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
J udgc Bryant H. Croft, presiding, which clarified the
estahlished entities and indicated who, in fact, was the
purchaser of S & E.
The complaint and supporting documents of this
District Court proceeding were attached as exhibits
to the Motion For ':V rit of Review ( R. 530-556). Although the facts are adequately set out in the :\lotion
for \\'rit of Review, we feel that a brief recapitulation
wou l cl he in order to better a pp raise the Court of the
situation.
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Frank .K .Martens, a party to these proceedi11 g\
and who participated in the hearing, sued l\Iiller an,
Linsay "\Varehouse Company, Inc., by his complai11
filed as Civil No. 176150 in the District Court fo
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on November 21
1967, some six months after the Commission entered
its Conclusions of Law and Findings of Fact, and
Award. Martens prayed for judgment of $47,076.871
and for $4,800 attorneys fees, based upon the allege1]
unpaid balance of the purchase price due and owinn
'
for the sale by him and the purchase of S & E by l\Iille1
and Lindsay "\ Varehouse ( R. 530) . Both Miller and
Lindsay "\ Varehouse filed answers and Lindsay ·warehouse filed a counterclaim ( R. 532 and 534) . Attached
to the counterclaim of Lindsay "\\T arehouse was the
final agreement between the parties dated June 13, 19tili
( R. 540) . The parties were indi ca ted as F. E. Martens
as seller, and Lindsay "\Varehouse Company, Inc., as
the buyer. Thereat' ter Miller filed a motion for sum·
mary judgment asking to dismiss him from the litiga·
tion inasmuch as the preliminary agreement, also dated
June 13, 1966, was superseded and terminated by the
final agreement of the same date (R. 546). There·
after, the Third District Court, the Honorable Bryant
H. Croft, on February 7, 1969 granted an order granting .Miller's motion for a summary judgment and dis·
missing Martens' complaint against Miller. It alsn
ordered that Miller's name be stricken from the caption
of the case ( R. 547) .
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The wm and substance of the preceding facts are

the fr.ial agreement between the parties was made
:1s .,tated between Martens and Lindsay
although 1'Iartens in his law suit sued both Miller incliYidually, and Lindsay 'Varehouse. The District Court
on February 7, 1969, found and ordered that .Miller,
iudiYiclually, had no liability to Martens for the unpaid
balance for the purchase of S & E, and dismissed Marte11s complaint against Miller.
tlni,

The Commission clearly recognizes that this evidence was indeed probative as to who was the actual
purchaser of S & E as set forth on page 1 of the Commission's denial for the Motion for Review, but sidesteps it in favor of another issue ( R. 561).
submit that the Commission should have allowed re-opening of the record to allow in the new
evidence, but instead it ignored the offered evidence
iu favor of its initial award, which now stands in clear
contradiction to the facts as to who was the actual
purchaser.
\\' e

Granted, the Commission has discretion as
whether or not to reopen the case, but such discretion
must be used so as not to be arbitrarily applied as we
belieYe it was in this case. This Court has specifically
forbidden such arbitrary use of discretion in Murphy
rn. Grand Cit,11, 1 Ut.2d 412, 268 P.2d 677 (1954).
The plaintiff argues that this new evidence, if
considered by the Commission, would have compelled
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a different result, and we submit that it was an abu\·
of discretion to not consider it. As set forth in Mi11
V8. Indu8trial Cornrni88ion, 113 Ut.88, 202 P.2d u;
( 1949), the Court indicated that where additiorn
evidence would not compel a contrary finding, ther,
is no abuse of discretion not to reopen. By a parity
reasoning then, we submit that where the additiona
evidence would compel a contrary finding, it would h,
an abuse of discretion not to reopen.
111

This Court has specifically authorized administrc
tive bodies to reopen a case for consideration, "Whe1
new eYidence is available, or new issues have arim
power of the eommission to reconsider the case is no1
curtailed." United Air Lines Transport Corporatio11
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 110 Ut. 590, m
P.2d 752 ( 1946), at 754. It is to be strongly argue<l.
therefore, that a contrary result would indeed han
been the result had the record been reopened. It is tlw
plaintiff's contention that Commission acted in
of its powers when it refused to reopen the case and
denied the petition for rehearing.
As stated pre·dously, the Commission acknowl·
edges that this newly addueed information could ma·
terially affect the basic issue in this case when it stated:
"However, it is the commission's opinion that
even if the S & E operation was in fact purchased
by Lindsa v \Varehouse Company (as evidenced
by the
attached to the motion for re·
view), eoverage of S & E Distributing Comp::tn)·
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\\ .·1-.; uot applied for nor extended to said emplo: ees." (R. 561).

l t ea11 thus be seen that the Conunissiou came as
clDse as posible to an outright admission that the District Court proceeding was conclusive as to who was
the purchaser of the business, but unfortunately negates
this proposition for an issue which we believe has been
adequately met and answered in Point I, and could
have been so resolved at a rehearing.

There is little doubt that the Industrial Commission eould have taken "judicial notice" of the District
Court proceeding. In 2 Am J ur 2d, Administrative
Law. Section 385, it states:
".Just as Courts take judicial notice of certain
matters in proceedings before them, administrative agencies may take judicial or 'official" notice. Ordinarily, an administrative agency may
appropriately act in a proceeding of an adjudieatory nature upon the record presented, and
such matter8 as maiJ properliJ receive its attention through official notice."
The United States Supreme Court in United St,ate8
·cs. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 90 L.Ed.
821, 66 S.Ct. 687 ( 1945), held that administrative
agencies are not pinned to the record any more than
arc the Courts.
l'.tah cases indicate that judicial notice can be
take11 by administrative bodies. In the case of Spencer
7'.I. tl1c Industrial Cornmi.8sion, 81 Ut. 511, 20 P.2d 618
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( 1933), the Court indicated that the Industrial Com-

mission may take judicial notice of other cases,
k, 11g
as it gives the other party an opportunity to meet i!
and it is made part of the record. In Putnam vs. The
Industrial Commission, 80 Ut. 187, 14 P.2d 973 (1932)
it was held that the Commission's notice of actions ill
a different cause and between different parties was
improper and would be excluded on review because it
could not be put into evidence without consent as primary facts testified to in the different case. Both of
these cases indicate that if properly put into the record
with notice to the other party such such notice is being
taken of the prior proceeding, then judicial notice will
indeed be proper.
The District Court proceeding not only was probative of the identity of corporate entites and parties,
but was between persons who were parties to the applicant's claim before the Commission. Reason and equity
demanded that the case should have been reopened
and that the Commission take notice of the District
Court's proceedings to better achieve the ends of justice.
Had the case been reopened, each party would hare
had an opportunity to submit proofs and to otherwise
contest the introduction of the District Court proceeding as evidenced before the Commission.
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POINT lll
THE lN DC ST RIAL COMMISSION'S FIND-

ING OF NON-COVERAGE AS TO MELVIN M.
)11LLER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, WAS CON-

THARY TO THE FACTS AND INSUFFICIENT 'l'O S UPPOR'l' THE AW ARD.

The plaintiff has attempted to show thus far in
his llrief, that the Industrial Commission was in error
whe11 it assessed liability against .Melvin Miller as a
result of alleged non-coverage by the State Insurance
Fund. He has attempted to illustrate that the policy
and scope of the State Insurance Fund and 'Yorkmen's
Compensation laws favor a very liberal construction
of said laws so as to afford coverage to every employee
and to cover the employer's entire liability to all of his
employees. It has also been argued that the Industrial
Commission was in error when it denied a motion for
review and refused to reopen the case for further consideration to allow additional evidence. If, as the case
may be, this Honorable Court finds the prior arguments unpersuasive we believe, in the alternative, that
the following argument justifies setting aside the Industrial Commission's award .
.:\luch of the arguments and evidence at the hearing
was presented by l\Iiller to show that Lindsey 'Yarehot1se was indeed the purchaser of the business, and
llqt l\Iiller as an individual. The Hearing Examiner,
however, felt the eYi<lence that Miller purchased the
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business as au iudividual outweighed the evidence tri
the contrary. In fact, the examiner put the issue rather
strongly:
"The coudusion is rather clear that }lilltr
acting as an individual, became the emplore1
and no relationship extended to the corporation
... there is no probative evidence to make a find.
ing that Lindsey "rarchouse Company was the
employer. There is substantial evidence to find
that
.M. )Iiller, an individual, doing busi.
ness as S & E Distributing Company was the
employer." (R. 514).
·

If this is so, and the Hearing Examiner uneqwvocably states that it is. we find a major inconsistemy
between the facts and the A ward.
The evidence is undisputed that policy #3L-372
with the State Insurance Fund was in effect covering
Miller as an individual doing business as Lindsay
Warehouse at the time of the fatal accident. The record
clearly indicates that the policy was an "individual'
policy designation, and remained such until September
13, 1966, approximately one month after the fatal acci·
dent (R. 450).
The Examiuer found that
"The Defendant State Insurance .Fund had
a compensation policy covering Lindsey YVare·
house Company. Inc. on this same date (Aug.
5, 1966). The endorsement coverinr; the corpora·
tion name (Lindsey Warehouse) was received
after the accident but the State Insurance Fund
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has not l'((ised that issue." ( R. 514) (emphasis

added)

Of course The Fund has not raised the issue because this issue is dispositive of the whole matter and
fatal to its case. So what if The Fund has not raise<l
this issue 1 The Fund is not acting for Miller and the
Corporation, but the Fund, unforunately, is the chief
adversary of Miller in these proceedings. It is not for
The .Fund to decide which is or is not probative and
important evidence but this is a job for the investigatory
powers of the Commission. Such a summary disposition
of an important issue cannot be counseled in the most
liberal interpretation of administrative processes: "The
Commission must not single out some portion of the
evidence and give it undue weight to the exclusion of
other eYidence of equal importance." Diaz vs. Industrial
Comm.ission, 80 Ut. 77, 13 P.2d 307 (1932).
In January of 1966 the State Insurance Fund reeeive<l the employers payroll and premium report for
the preceding six months, which indicated that the policy
was now covering an employer whose status was designated as a corporation (R. 142). The policy, however,
remained in the name of Mel Miller as an individual
until September of 1966 as previously mentioned. The
Fund may argue that inasmuch as Miller gave notice
that the policy should be designated as covering a corporation, that he should be estopped from asserting
that there was coverage to hin1 as an individual at the
time of the accident. It is a general rule of law that
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insurance contracts should be construed most strongly
against the insurer rather than the insured. As statell
in 43 . Am J ur :2d, Insurance, Section 271
"The general rule applicable to contrad1
generally, that a written agreement should, j11
the case of doubt as to the meaning thereof, be
interpreted as against the party who has drawn
it, it is very frequently applied to policies of
insurance and constitutes an important rule of
construction in such respect, in view of the fact
that ordinarily, and in practically all cases, it is
the insurer who furnishes or prepares the policies
used to embody the insurance contracts."
Because of the special status of the State Insurance
Fund, and the unique position of the employee beneficiary under such a policy of insurance, it is submitted
that the State Insurance Fund should indeed be liable
for this claim and estopped from denying such liability
by reason of the fact that policy remained in the name
of Miller as an individual. This Court has held that
the State Insurance Fund does not occupy a
favorable position than does an insurance company or
a self-insuring employee. See W uldberg vs. The Indus-

trial Commission, 74 Ut. 309, 279 P 609 (1929). It
seems quite clear, then, that the policy coverage should
be construed most favorably to the insured, and afford
coverage to any business tha tMiller engaged in as an
individual proprietor.
The question then becomes, if on the date of the
accident The Fund's policy provided coverage to :Miller,
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an individual, as an insured, it is entirely inconsistent
for the award tu contain a finding of non-coverage as
to
daitn of the ('laimant. If, as the Examiner fimL,
:'ll1ller acquired S & E as an individual, in his own
1·ight, and if the policy was in the name of Miller as
an individual, affording coverage to any business activity in which he \vas engaged at the time as an indiYidual proprietor, it is unmistakenly clear that S & E
employees would then be covered under Miller's existing policy with the State Insurance Fund. Any other
conclusion from the established and undisputed facts
would be contrary to logic and reasoning. However,
the Commission has seen fit to disregard these clear
and undisputed facts and has assessed personal liability
against Miller because it found that there was no insurance in existence for the employees of S & E.
The Commission's Fiu<lings of .Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Award are in clear contradiction of the
facts. Iu view of the foregoing it is clear that there
is Ho "substantial evidence" upon which the Commission could fin<l that Miller was not covered by insurance, and its award to that effect must be set aside.

CONCLUSION
'l'he implications of this proceeding are, by any
measure. more far-reaching than the mere correcting
of a11 erroneous award against an innocent party. They
give this Honorable Court a unique opportunity to
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clearly define the ua ture and extent of the responsi.
bility of the State Insurance Fund to the ·working
people of Utah.
As demonstrated by the foregoiug arguments, tht
State Insurance Fund is much more than au ordinan
insurance carrier, and as such has a unique and specifi,t
duty to the beneficiary of its coverage. The employee
as beneficiary stands in the position of having a nsted
right, and should not be denied speedy and adequate
compensation when a policy of insurance exists with
the State Insurance Fund from which compensation
could be had.
As has been demonstrated, the Utah Courts ban
traditionally looked upon this type of problem with
great liberality, going to great lengths to find that an
employee was indeed covered by the policy of insur·
ance. There is no justification for releasing the State
Insurance Fund from its intended purposes. The weight
of legislative intent requires it, and public policy de·
mands it. The Industrial Commission and The Fund
should be compelled to act in accordance with the spirit
and purpose of the 'Vorkmens Compensation Act.
The foregoing arguments should also amply illus·
trate that the Industrial Commission has acted in dis·
regard of undisputed facts. The evidence clearly inrli·
cated that at the time of the initial award that the
plaintiff, Melvin M. Miller, was covered by an insur·
ance policy with the State Insurance Fund. No search·
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ing investigation was necessary, the facts were therereadily available, easily discernable.
TLL Corr.rr1ission was also given an opportunity

to correct its erroneous award when the defendant filed
his Motion for Review. Denial of this motion constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission, which discretion was exercised in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.
This plaintiff recogpizes that the claimant is legitimately entitled to compensation, not by any wrong
perpetrated by the plaintiff himself, but by reason of
the \ Vorkmens Compensation Act. Hardship has been
imposed upon both parties long enough. The award of
the Commission should be set aside and remanded with
directions to award claimant compensation by reason
of coverage through the State Insurance Fund.
Respectfully submitted,
WAYNE C. DURHAM
510 American Oil Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing this ........ day of December, 19601
to Robert D. Moore, Attorney at Law, Judge Building1
Salt Lake City, Utah; to Jack L. Schoenhals, Attorney
at Law, Keams Building, Salt Lake City, Utah; to
F. E. Martens, 3685 Millcreek Road, Salt Lake City,
Utah; and to the Industrial Commission of Utah, State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

WAYNE C. DURHAM

